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I
INTRODUCTION

A distinctive feature of medical malpractice law is its acceptance of medical
custom as the dispositive legal standard of care. Outside the field of medical
malpractice, long established legal doctrine accords limited weight to custom
in defining the general standard of care in negligence cases.' In medical
practice, by contrast, the legal standard of due care is virtually defined by the
customary skills and practices of the profession. A showing of subconformity
to custom here ordinarily yields liability, while conformity ordinarily
forecloses it; as a corollary, the metes and bounds of custom are required to
be established by medical experts qualified to speak to the particular skills or
practice in question.2 As there are always exceptions to the general rule, so
also there are exceptions to the general exception: liability may be
established without expert testimony or independently of professional custom
in cases where negligence is obvious to the lay observer or where medical
3
judgment is not implicated.
The justification for treating malpractice cases differently from other
accident cases is by no means obvious or simple. Posner has suggested that a
distinction might rest on the notion that custom in malpractice cases was used
essentially as evidence of the parties' contractual expectations. 4 There is
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1. The classic modern statement of the rule is that ofJudge Hand in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d
737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). The rule is much older, however. See, e.g., Hilbler v. McCartney, 31 Ala. 501
(1858); Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100 (1884); Maynard v. Buck, 100 Mass. 40 (1868).
2. See, e.g., McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 560 (1959).
3. ld. at 621-31. Perceived liberalization of this exception provoked a spate of legislative
enactments on the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and on the requirement for expert
testimony, but it does not appear that the traditional common law rules have been much changed.
See Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 5, 27-30.
4. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 126-27 (2d ed. 1977).
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support for this view in early medical cases. 5 However, this explanation does
not account for nonmedical cases involving contractual relationships where
custom might be but is not accorded the same deference. 6 In any case,
custom-as-contract cannot adequately explain the modern judicial treatment
which has crystallized professional norms into a fixed rule of public obligation
unalterable by private agreement.
II
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CUSTOMARY PRACTICE RULE

A.

Technical Complexity and Fairness

Morris, whose treatment of the role of custom is deservedly considered a
classic, thought the distinction between medical malpractice and other cases
was compelled by the fact that judges or juries were not competent to
determine whether a doctor had acted reasonably: "The conformity test is
probably the only workable test available."-7 According to Morris, lay people
are not sufficiently knowledgeable about the complexities of medicine to be
able to distinguish reasonable and unreasonable levels of skill or care, nor are
they competent to evaluate relevant nonmedical circumstances.
The rationale of lay incompetence accords with modern judicial treatment,
as is underscored by the cases in which customary norms are not dispositive
because lay observers can detect medical negligence without expert guidance.
This rationale, however, proves too much. Courts and juries are asked daily
to judge disputed matters beyond their personal ken. Invariably, in complex,
nonmedical cases they are informed by expert testimony and other evidence,
but the ultimate evaluation of that evidence is not left to the professionals. Of
course, in any such dispute, the plaintiff must offer a prima facie case, which
means, as a practical matter, that on complex issues of fact and judgment
there must be at least enough expert evidence to make a credible complaint.
In the case of "ordinary" complexity, however, experts are free to roam
among possible alternatives-and the judge or jury is free to accept their
assessments-without regard to customary norms. In malpractice cases the
expert evidence must be directed at a single question: Did the defendant
conform to customary norms?
In some of these cases it might be better to take such complex matters out
of the hands of courts, or at least out of the hands of juries; this has been
partially done in some jurisdictions to the extent of permitting claims to be
submitted to binding arbitration or requiring their review by screening panels
before trial. 8 But forum choice is another issue. The question here is whether
5. See, e.g., Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene 441 (Iowa 1848); Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.H. 460
(1853); McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (1853); see also I F. HILLIARD, LAW OF TORTS 252-54 (2d
ed. Boston 1861).
6. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 125-26,
concedes the point.
7. Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (1942).
8. See Robinson, supra note 3, at 25-26.
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there is any basis for separating one distinct set of complex issues from
another for purposes of defining the ambit of judicial discretion.
It might be more fruitful to seek an explanation not in the complexity of
the activity as such, but in the special difficulty of identifying a compensable
event in a context in which many plaintiffs are predisposed to harm by the
conditions that cause them to seek treatment. Moreover, quite apart from any
predisposing condition, it is the nature of medical treatment that it often
entails a risk of harm that could not be avoided with due care. A properly
applied rule of negligence should cabin liability within acceptable bounds.
Morris believes, however, that the fear of judicial erosion of the ordinary
negligence standard requires special protection against "undeserved
liability." 9

If "undeserved liability" is a problem, it is surely not unique to medical
practice. The threat of ill-considered liability, often coupled with excessive
recoveries, is a pervasive one in other areas of tort law, such as products
liability, where compliance with custom is not an automatic defense. It may
be that the demarcation of causal responsibility is a vexing problem for
malpractice cases, but it, too, is not unique to the malpractice area. A similar
problem is encountered in letting courts and juries set product design
standards.' 0
Morris's concern over "undeserved liability" is expressed essentially in
fairness terms, although he nowhere attempts to explain why it would be
"unfair" to hold physicians to the standard of care required of other tort
defendants. To say that liability is "undeserved" is entirely question-begging
until we have established a normative benchmark for measuring moral desert
in this context.
B.

Incentives: Promoting Deterrence Without Encouraging
Defensive Medicine

Whether or not holding physicians to a more rigorous standard would be
unfair, it might be inefficient if it had inappropriate incentive effects.
Consider, for example, the rationale offered by McCoid for the customimmunity rule:
[The medical practitioner's] judgment should be free to operate in the best interests
of the patient. If the "judge" is himself to be judged by some outsider who relies on
after-acquired knowledge of unsatisfactory results or unfortunate consequences in
reaching a decision as to liability, the medical judgment may be hampered and the
doctor may become hesitant to rely upon his developed instinct in diagnosis and
treatment. If, on the other hand, the doctor knows that his conduct is to be evaluated
in terms of what other highly trained medical practitioners would have done or would
accept as competent medical practice, he is more likely to pursue his own judgment

9.
10.

Morris, supra note 7, at 1165.
On the difficulties in defining the standards for product design see Henderson, Judicial

Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531

(1973).
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when he is confident of the diagnosis and line of treatment, and is more likely to
provide good medical service for his patient.' l

McCoid's rationale seems distinctly odd in supposing that the effect of the
rule is to foster independent medical judgment. A rule compelling
conformity to custom would scarcely seem calculated to induce the doctor to
"pursue his own judgment." On the contrary, the rule creates precisely the
opposite incentive, for it is only the individual's judgment, as distinct from
that of the medical community, that exposes him to the risk of liability.
McCoid's defense of custom also expresses the more general concern that
second-guessing medical practitioners might force doctors to practice
"defensive medicine." This is an ageless complaint against malpractice
liability generally' 2 and requires some examination.
It is noteworthy that both Morris and McCoid assume liability has a
deterrent effect on physicians' behavior. Some observers, however, doubt
that liability rules have an important effect on the behavior of prospective tort
defendants. In particular it is argued that liability insurance usually insulates
defendants from the direct costs of liability and thus destroys the economic
incentives that are supposed to constrain risk-creating activity. 13 Of course,
insurance is not costless, and some measure of deterrence is presumably
achieved by setting insurance premiums that reflect the risk-creating
propensities of the insured. As is commonly observed, however, the
mechanism for adjusting insurance costs to each insured's behavior is crude;
much of the deterrent effect is dissipated through "community rating" that
assigns accident costs to broad classes of individuals or activities, thereby
externalizing

the

costs. 14

Plainly,

this

observation

conflicts

with the

widespread perception of "defensive medicine": if insurance practices
effectively screen out the impact of liability, what would be the incentive to
avoid it by practicing "defensively"? A physician's practice of defensive
medicine would at best confer a small benefit upon the insured's risk class.
Although community rating insurance does tend to insulate insureds from
direct financial costs, they may bear other costs that affect their behavior.
Some carriers assess special surcharges on physicians against whom claims
have been filed in prior policy years.' 5 Moreover, companies may refuse to
renew policies for individuals deemed to be poor risks. Finally, legal liability
imposes some costs that are uninsurable, such as harm to reputation,
disruption of the physician's practice, and emotional stress caused by
11. McCoid, supra note 2, at 608.
12.

See Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE & APPENDIX 38, 39 (1973) (surveys of
physicians indicate that "between 50 and 70 percent of all physicians claim they practice defensive
medicine of one sort or another").
13. See, e.g., Pierce, EncouragingSafety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 1281, 1300 (1980).
14. Id. at 1299-1300. On class rating of health care providers in particular, see Brook, Brutoco
& Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1206.
15. See P. Danzon, Liability Insurance and the Tort System: The Case of Medical Malpractice
20-21 (Hoover Institution Working Paper, 1983).
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litigation. These are real costs which a physician presumably will seek to
avoid even if they are not accompanied by direct economic penalties. Since
these costs are a function of liability, which is presumed to be a function of the
physician's risk-creating behavior, there are several clear mechanisms of
deterrence independent of individualization of premiums. It remains to
define the boundary between appropriate deterrence and inappropriate
"defensive medicine."
That legal liability induces costly and unproductive avoidance strategies"defensive medicine"-by physicians has long been an article of faith of the
health care profession, and one of that profession's foremost indictments of
malpractice law. As malpractice claims have increased in recent years, so too
have the complaints about the costs of defensive medicine. In 1985 the
American Medical Association estimated that the annual cost of defensive
medicine now exceeds $15 billion. 16 Even in the context of an annual health
care budget that exceeds $375 billion,1 7 a cost of $15 billion for unproductive
medical practices would be reason for grave concern. It would be, that is, if
there were good reason to believe that costs of such magnitude are being
incurred.
In fact, evidence of defensive medicine is notoriously unreliable. The
AMA's estimate was based on the most casual empirical technique-soliciting
physicians' subjective opinions through an AMA survey. The basis for those
opinions in this particular survey is not revealed; however, if earlier reports of
defensive medicine by health care providers are representative of the
rationale underlying those opinions, one must be deeply skeptical.
Part of the problem is methodological; the absence of systematic, rigorous
survey techniques and unbiased observers has been frequently noted.", A
deeper problem is the absence of an adequate definition of what constitutes
"defensive medicine." Customary usage applies this term to practices that are
not warranted or appropriate according to accepted standards of medical
practice. However, because the canons of accepted practice allow a
considerable range for different individual judgments as to what is warranted
or appropriate, the definition of defensive medicine becomes a matter of
individual motive that is difficult to measure. More important, the
measurement parameters are skewed insofar as they are based on what the
reporting physician deems warranted or appropriate, and not on whether the
practices are what the legal system contemplates as appropriate. Given that
the social control of medical practice is a major purpose of legal intervention,
16.

SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. AND INS., AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

IN THE '80s,

REPORT

1, at 6 (1984). The estimate is based on surveyed physicians' reports as to the

percentage of diagnostic testing and treatment procedures conducted "as a response to the
increased risk of professional liability." Cost estimates were derived from these data and from
estimated annual billings.
17. See Levit, National Health Expenditures, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 9 (1985) (1984 health care
expenditures totalled $387.4 billion).
18. For critiques of the evidence, see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
BEYOND MALPRACTICE: COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL INJURIES 16-17 (1978); Brook, Brutoco &
Williams, supra note 14, at 1218-20.
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"defensive medicine" cannot be measured by reference to medical opinion
alone, but must reflect the broader social standards that justify liability.
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that what some providers report as
"defensive medicine" includes practices that are quite consistent with
reducing iatrogenic risk, whether or not that is their intended purpose.' 9
The foregoing is not to suggest that health care providers do not seek to
reduce the risk of liability through practices that are medically or
economically unjustified, and therefore socially dysfunctional. A far more
discriminating analysis of the nature of these avoidance strategies is required,
however, in order to measure confidently the magnitude of the problem. In
any event, assuming that health care providers' defensive strategies are of
such character and of such magnitude as to prompt concern, it by no means
follows that the appropriate response is to restrict liability exposure as the
AMA and others have argued. The risk of liability is a necessary but not
sufficient condition of defensive medicine. The insufficiency of liability
becomes clear upon examination of why the problem of dysfunctional liability
avoidance (expenditures in excess of safety benefits) is thought to be special
to health care rather than a generic problem of all tort liability.
Some commentators have observed that all liability rules are capable of
inducing either overinvestment or underinvestment in care under certain
conditions, most notably when there is uncertainty as to application of the
rule.20 Outside the health care field, however, the possibility of excessive
expenditures to avoid liability has not generally been perceived as a large
practical problem. The reason for the difference between health care and
other activities in this respect is quite simple. In the latter, the market
constrains excessive expenditures. For example, product manufacturers
contemplating excessive investments in care or other dysfunctional strategies
to avoid liability are restrained by their limited ability to pass on their costs in
the form of higher prices. To be sure, in markets characterized by inadequate
information and inadequate competition, the manufacturer will have some
freedom to pass on such inefficiently incurred costs. But few commercial
markets permit the freedom to pass on inefficiently incurred costs to an extent
permitted by the health care market. Third-party payments for health care
2
costs significantly lessen market constraints on health care expenditures. '
To the extent that the health care market is unable to monitor and control
health care expenditures generally, it is unable to distinguish expenditures
incurred for purposes of avoiding liability or promoting health.
19.

See Zuckerman, Medical Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs, and the Practice of Defensive Medicine,
Fall 1984, at 128, 131, for reports of surveys of physician responses to increased
premium costs. The responses include such practices as increased referrals, additional treatments,
and refusal to take certain cases.
20. See C. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 299-302 (1983); Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984). See generally Cooter, Prices and
Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
21. See infra note 53.
HEALTH AFF.,
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Recent cost containment measures, such as the diagnosis-related group
reimbursement system (DRG's), 2 2 or alternative health care delivery systems
designed to introduce cost efficiency, such as health maintenance
organizations (HMO's) or preferred provider organizations (PPO's), 23 might

reduce inefficient expenditures. Though these systems are, not specifically
directed against defensive medical expenditures, to the extent that they
succeed in curbing inefficient expenditures generally, they presumably will
curb defensive medicine as well. 2 4 However, it remains to be seen how well

the general objective of cost efficiency will be achieved.
It also remains to be seen how the malpractice liability rules will
accommodate this objective in evaluating cost-constrained health care
decisions. If cost containment measures can curb excessive expenditures
incurred to avoid liability, they also might impede legitimate expenditures
that the liability rule demands insofar as the rule does not take the new cost
25
constraints into account.
If the common law reliably followed Judge Learned Hand's celebrated
economic calculus, 26 there would be little problem accommodating these new
economic constraints (assuming the constraints themselves reflect a
reasonable benefit-cost analysis). Unfortunately, Judge Hand's benefit-cost
test does not appear to be an important element in malpractice
jurisprudence. 2 7 The word "appear" is used advisedly; here, as elsewhere in
22. The DRG system, adopted by Medicare and some state Medicaid programs, fixes third-party
payments for hospital costs on the basis of predetermined prices for different diagnostically related
categories of treatment. Cost reimbursement is fixed according to the DRG classification given each
patient on discharge, based on a grouping of factors: the patient's principal diagnosis or surgical
procedure, the presence of an important secondary diagnosis, age, and whether the patient was alive
at discharge. Payments for each DRG are based on average costs incurred for treatment of patients
falling into that general category. See, e.g., Stern & Epstein, Institutional Responses to Prospective Payment
Based on Diagnosis-RelatedGroups, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 621 (1984).
23. On alternative delivery systems and competition as means of cost control, see generally
Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1981).
24. It is also possible, however, that some cost containment mechanisms will themselves
produce dysfunctional responses no less ineffecient than defensive medicine. For example, it has
been widely noted that DRG's may skew incentives to select certain diagnoses and treatments in
order to seek reimbursement under high-payment, high-profit DRG's. See, e.g., Omenn & Conrad,
Implications of DRGsfor Clinicians, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1314 (1984); Stern & Epstein, supra note 22.
25. The problem of placing providers in a "double bind" by requiring them to respond to the
conflicting demands of cost containment and traditional professional care standards is noted in
Havighurst, DecentralizingDecision Making: Private Contract versus ProfessionalNorms, inMARKET REFORMS
INHEALTH CARE 22 (J. Meyer ed. 1983). Havighurst argues for contractual adjustment of the liability
rule in order to align these competing demands, an argument expanded on below (though not
specially as a means of cost control).
26. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). For elaborations of
the economic meaning of Hand's simple formula, see Brown, Toward An Economic Theory of Liability, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 332 (1973); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972).
27. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), is sometimes cited as an illustrative
application of the economic approach to medical malpractice. See, e.g., Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors,
Damages and Deterrence. An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1283
(1978). What is most noteworthy about Helling, however, is that it did not apply the accepted
professional custom standard of malpractice, and is thus out of step with prevailing legal doctrine.
Of course, it is possible that professional norms may align with economic efficiency in a particular
case. Interestingly, in Helling it appears that contrary to the defendant's assertion, accepted by
plaintiff and the court, there was a routine practice of giving the tests which the court thought
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the realm of negligence, the "reasonableness" standard is susceptible to
varying interpretations about its economic content.2 8 To the extent medical
negligence embraces the traditional norms of the medical profession it is
almost forced to reject Judge Hand's test. Relatively undisciplined by market
constraints on expenditures, medicine has evolved a culture that traditionally
has been hostile to economic efficiency, particularly as a desideratum of
"sound" medical practice. 2 9 The emergence of for-profit medicine and
concern about the level of health care costs are now changing health care's
traditional insulation from economic criteria.3 0 The law has recognized this
transformation to the extent of legislation and regulations facilitating cost
containment measures and the economically oriented alternative delivery
systems just mentioned. However, the common law of malpractice has given
no obvious recognition to this transformation in medicine, although the
absence of visible signs may simply reflect the common law's affinity for
ambiguity in both rule and principle. In any event, the future test of realism
for malpractice law will be how well it accommodates economic changes in
health care.
Precisely what these economic changes imply in terms of liability and
related legal rules governing responsibility for medical accidents can be
debated. At a minimum, they should imply the necessity of taking a hard look
at the role of liability rules in encouraging efficient health care practices.
Among other things, they also suggest rethinking accepted legal conventions
about the allocation of medical accident risks.
C.

Allocating Accident Risks Between Provider and Patient

If the foregoing analysis is sound, one must question legislative efforts
since the mid-1970's to give medical professionals greater protection against
liablity for medical accidents. Granted, prior liberalization of liability
standards was partly responsible for the marked increase in claims frequency
and insurance costs. Nevertheless, a plausible rationale can be offered for
such a movement in the direction of stricter liability for providers of services
as dangerous as medical care.
To the extent the tort system measures the social costs of medical
maloccurrences with reasonable accuracy, increased liability may achieve the
efficiency considerations required regardless of community practice. See Wiley, The Impact ofJudicial
Decisionson Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 383 (1981). As noted in the
text, however, the alignment of economic efficiency and professional medical custom must be
regarded as exceptional.
28. For differing interpretations of the economic content of negligence cases generally, compare
Posner, supra note 26, with Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Fault Principle. A Reinterpretation, 15
GA. L. REV. 925 (1981). See also Smith, Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 MINN. L. REV.
277, 305-08 (1984).
29. See Havighurst, supra note 25.
30. On the changing character of medicine, see generally P. STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE

379-449 (1982); Tarlov, Shattuck Lecture-The Increasing

Supply of Physicians, the Changing Structure of the Health-Services System, and the Future Practice of Medicine,
308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1235 (1983).

Page 173: Spring 1986]

ALLOCATION OF RISKS

economic objective of allocating costs to those who, in general, appear best
able to minimize their occurrence or to distribute them efficiently. Even if the
present tort system does not accurately measure the social costs of medical
maloccurrences, it is doubtful that the system as a whole overestimates the
social costs of medical malpractice. The occasional excessive damage award
and meritless claim are probably more than offset by underenforcement of
meritorious claims. 3 ' If so, one might infer that liability rules ought not be
constricted but instead should be liberalized.
Of course, the inference that providers of medical care should bear more,
not fewer, risks does not follow necessarily from the efficiency goal of cost
internalization, which is met by patient cost bearing, as well as by physician
liability. If there is an economic preference for the latter, it must rest on the
intuition that physicians are better able than patients either to reduce accident
costs or to distribute them efficiently-that they are, in Calabresi's argot,
cheaper cost avoiders. 3 2 The term "intuition" is used to denote the fact that it
is not easily demonstrated that physicians are necessarily superior risk bearers
for all medical risks or for any particular subclass of such risks. As far as the
loss distribution (risk spreading) function is concerned, it is not clear that
providers have better access to insurance markets than do patients; indeed,
most patients are already well protected by so-called collateral sources against
many of the risks of medical injury. It also appears that the third-party
insurance to which providers have access is both less comprehensive and
more costly (due to the complex liability rules that govern whether a
particular loss will be indemnified) than the first-party insurance which covers
patients. As for the accident reduction function, provider liability
presupposes that accident costs "feed back" into medical practice decisions.
It may be presumed that this happens to a degree, even though, as noted
earlier, present insurance rating practices blunt the effect of this feedback and
other nonfinancial incentives must be relied upon to inspire due care.
The fact that the present system of provider liability is not optimally
efficient in distributing losses and reducing the creation of risk does not, of
course, establish that any other allocation of risks would be better. In
particular, it is widely believed that requiring patients ultimately to bear
medical risks would be even less efficient because of their relative ignorance
of medical risks and their more limited control over the risk-creating events.
These conditions of patient incompetence are intensified to the extent that
the underlying demand for health care is perceived to be a medical necessity,
implying that foregoing medical treatment is not a realistic option.
31. Studies indicating a large disparity between the number of compensable injuries and the
number of claims filed point to significant underenforcement. See Robinson, supra note 3, at 14.
32. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135-73
(1970). The term has become widely adopted as a shorthand expression for optimal risk bearing.
See, e.g., Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972); Landes & Posner,
Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980). Repetitive usage has
not, unfortunately, given the concept any greater precision.
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The search for the best risk bearer or cost avoider is made more difficult
because, however risks are allocated, the insurance system passes costs
through to patients and the community at large. Indeed, because of this passthrough of costs, it is questionable whether it makes much difference whether
physicians are liable or the loss is left to lie with patients; either way, the
public at large will ultimately bear the costs of such risks. Possibly the initial
placement of liability might make a difference in how (and how well) the risk is
administered. The channels of risk distribution will differ depending on
whether the costs are distributed initially through physicians' liability
insurance or through patients' disability and health insurance. Also, the risk
avoidance strategies might be different for physician and patient, depending
on their ability to perceive the costs as they are distributed through the
different channels. These are, primarily, empirical questions; there is no basis
forjudging, a priori, that one risk distribution channel is superior to the other
in all cases.
Those readers familiar with the Coase theorem will recognize that
uncertainty about efficient loss allocation is essentially irrelevant if the parties
can negotiate without significant impediments. 3 3 In many tort contexts,
transaction costs preclude any simple bargain solution; for example, in the
paradigm accident involving strangers (such as an auto accident), transaction
costs pose formidable, even insurmountable, obstacles, requiring the law to
prescribe liability rules. No such obstacles appear to stand in the way of
patient/physician bargaining, however. The parties to a medical transaction
are not only not strangers but they have already entered into a contractual
arrangement. That contract, in addition to specifying what the parties will do
to benefit each other, might also prescribe how risks are to be allocated. If it
does, the question arises whether the tort system's rules for allocating risks
are thereby displaced or whether the court will ignore the contract's terms
and apply tort doctrine.
The contractual character of the physician/patient relationship has
become obscured in modern times. In the nineteenth century, the source of
the physician's duty of care was derived as much from principles of contract as
from those of tort.3 4 In the twentieth century, contractually shaped duties
have been largely supplanted by conceptions of obligations derived from a
general public policy independent of the parties' contractual intent. The shift
in orientation from contract to tort has been reinforced, if not caused, by
professional, social, and regulatory efforts to distinguish the provision of
health care services from ordinary commercial transactions and to create an
aura of professionalism untainted by crass commercialism. 3 5 This general
33. See Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
34. See sources cited supra note 5. The English case usually cited as the seminal formulation of
the custom standard for malpractice, Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. K.B. 359, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (1767), was
brought as a contract action.
35. See K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 186-89 (1974). Arrow views this
noncommercial aspect as inherent in the nature of medical services (particularly the problems of
measuring quality, consumer dependency, etc.) and consumer expectations. This view seems
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view of the special character of health care was carried over into traditional
common law attitudes toward the physician/patient relationship. As noted
earlier, 3 6 the traditional antipathy of health care professionals toward
commercial practices and organization is now rapidly changing with the
emergence of new, economically oriented delivery systems and cost control
measures, but recognition of this fact does not yet appear in. common law
doctrine or attitudes toward health care services.
Nevertheless, whatever the legal view of health care in general, the
provider/patient relationship is grounded in contract and most of the
economic terms are set by the usual elements of contract formation. What
needs to be considered, then, is whether there is any reason to treat risk of
injury differently from all other terms of the bargain. This article argues that
there is not; I am obviously not the first to so argue. Epstein and Havighurst,
among others, have both argued for contractual risk allocation. 37 The
argument presented in this article is parallel to theirs, but examines the
negative case in more detail. In addition, as Epstein's writings have done, it
defends even the most extreme form of risk allocation contract-the
exculpatory clause, which shifts all risks of injury to the patient. It follows a
fortiori from the arguments presented here that less sweeping reallocations of
rights and responsibilities, of the kind suggested by Havighurst and elsewhere
in this symposium, should also receive a respectful judicial hearing.
III
EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST CONTRACT

The affirmative case for contract is simple and powerful. In terms of
utilitarian efficiency, contractual arrangements allow parties to achieve the
most efficient combination of efforts to manage risk in accordance with their
respective comparative advantages and their respective risk preferences. The

moral argument proceeds along similar lines but emphasizes the fact that
contractual allocation promotes individual freedom of choice, constrained
only by the need to accommodate the divergent interests of the contracting
parties. To justify private ordering one need not suppose that it always yields
"good" or "fair" results. It is enough that, in general, private parties are
somewhat naive in ignoring the role of the profession itself in promoting the conditions on which
such a conception rests. See P. STARR, supra note 30, at 198-232. The profession's efforts to remove
itself and its services from commercialism were related to its historical opposition to the intrusion of
corporate enterprise into medical services. The overriding objective, as Starr explains, was to avoid
"the kind of hierarchial controls that typically prevail in industrial capitalism." Id. at 216. To this
end, the AMA in the 1930's declared it was "unprofessional" for a physician to allow his services to
be used by profit-seeking investors (other than himself or his professional colleagues), explaining
that " 'where physicians become employees and permit their services to be peddled as commodities,
the medical services usually deteriorate, and the public which purchases such services is injured.' "
Id. at 217, quoting

BUREAU OF MEDICAL ECON., AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF

36.

49-50 (1935).
See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.

37.

Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87;

MEDICINE

Havighurst, supra note 25, at 31.42.
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likely to achieve results that are at least as good and fair for themselves as
38
would be achieved by paternalistic intervention.
Despite the general acceptance of contractual risk allocation in the world
of ordinary commercial transactions, courts have been extremely hostile to
contractual allocation of tortiously created risk. In the field of medical risks,
courts have generally rejected out-of-hand attempts by physicians and
hospitals to shift the risk of negligence to patients. 3 9 Tunkl v. Regents of the
University of California,40 the leading case, is reasonably representative of the
judicial attitude. In Tunkl, plaintiff, as a condition of his admission to the
U.C.L.A. Medical Center, executed a release form relieving the Center of
"any and all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its
employees, if the hospital has used due care in selecting its employees."'4 1
The California Supreme Court held that the release was void as against public
policy. 4 2 The court sought to draw a line between exculpatory contracts that
43
involved mere "private interests" and those affecting the "public interest.
The court considered several general criteria for defining public interest:
(1) the party seeking immunity is engaged in performing a service thought
suitable for public regulation or one of great public "importance" and
"practical necessity"; (2) the party seeking immunity holds himself out as
willing to perform this service to any member of the public (or any member
meeting "certain established standards"); (3) as a result of the "essential
nature of the service" and in the "economic setting of the transaction" there
is a "decisive advantage of bargaining strength" favoring the party seeking
immunity; (4) the exculpatory contract is a "standardized contract of
adhesion" and makes no provision whereby the other party may pay
"additional reasonable fees" and obtain protection; (5) the person or
property of the purchaser (patient) is under the control of the party seeking
44
immunity and thereby subject to the risk of that party's carelessness.
Of the criteria listed above, the first two seem either irrelevant or questionbegging. Whether health care is a matter suitable for public regulation only
begs the question of what kinds of public regulation are suitable-in
particular whether judicial interference with contractual risk allocation is
38.

Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and Cure, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

245, 257 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978).
39. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981); Meiman v. Rehabilitation
Center, Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1969); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977).
40. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr 33 (1963). The court's opinion cites numerous
earlier decisions invalidating exculpatory contracts where the "public interest" was affected. The

"public interest" in those cases appears generally, though not invariably, to have involved regulated

businesses ("affected with a public interest").

Rather curiously, the court does not cite the then

recent decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which
has become the leading precedent for invalidating liability waivers in the closely related area of
product liability cases.
41. Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 94, 383 P.2d at 442, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
42. Id. at 94, 383 P.2d at 441-42, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
43. Id. at 96-98, 383 P.2d at 443-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 35-39.
44.

The court's opinion does not catalogue its reasons in exactly the same order, or with the

same precision, as the list above suggests.
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appropriate. The criterion of holding out to the public is simply the mindless
adaptation of an ancient rule for common carriers. 45 It begs the question of
what is the proper scope of the holding out; in Tunkl the extent of the holding
out was presumably limited by the contractual conditions of admission, which
included a waiver. The third and fourth criteria fit conventional doctrine
supporting judicial scrutiny of contractual bargains generally, and they
warrant some attention. The fifth criterion is a bit nebulous, but it may be
interpreted-rather freely, perhaps-to denote a concern over the loss of
deterrence and the creation of moral hazard.
A.

Adhesion Contracts, Choice, and Bargaining Power

Disparity of bargaining strength and use of standardized contracts of
adhesion are time-honored rationales for judicial supervision of private
contracts. They form the core of the unconscionability doctrine in consumer
transactions. 4 6 Judicial surveillance of contracts to protect individuals against
the superior bargaining power of others, against contracts of adhesion, or
against unconscionable bargains is a subject more than adequately covered in
existing legal literature. 4 7 It is enough here to show that unconscionability is
not a generic problem of medical risk "bargains." Given the assumption that
individual medical service contracts are not less subject to judicial monitoring
than ordinary commercial transactions, there is still no warrant for a blanket
prohibition against contractual arrangements dealing with medical risks.
Standardized contracts are a characteristic of virtually all routine
commercial transactions, most of which do not remotely involve the kind of
bargaining problem that would warrant, or attract, judicial concern. A
purchase of oranges at a grocery involves a standardized contract.
Standardization in such cases is merely an efficient means of minimizing the
contract costs of multiple transactions 48 and, in itself, is not evidence of
unfairness. Parties to such arrangements benefit from cost-efficient
transactions, however, and there is no basis for presuming that the benefits
45. On the holding-out question, the court relies on Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del.
15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961), in which a private hospital was held to a duty to serve because it maintained
an emergency ward. However, the traditional rule has been that health care providers are not
necessarily engaged in a public calling merely by virtue of their providing medical services. While
there has been some erosion of the traditional rule in the case of health care institutions, the scope of
an individual physician's "calling" generally remains a matter of private contract. E.g., Lyons v.
Grether, 218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103 (1977).
46. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Epstein,
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAw & ECON. 293 (1975); Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Schwartz, A Reexamination of
Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1977).
47. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 46. On the particular problem of "adhesion contracts"standardized form contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis-see Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An

Essay in Reconstruction, 96

HARV.

L.

REV.

1173 (1983).

48. On the costs of individualizing, see Schwartz supra note 46, at 1064-71. Standardization of
terms not only avoids the costs of individualizing any given contract, but may also reduce market
search costs by facilitating comparison of terms offered by different competitors. See Schwartz &
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 630, 672 (1979).
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are distributed between them so inequitably as to invite judicial interference.
The problem with standardized contracts arises when they are associated with
one party's market power and with a concomitant limitation on options
available to the other party, or when they are associated with information
asymmetries, which will be discussed below. 49 The Tunkl court's concern over
the patient's lack of choice is not carefully articulated, but it appears to mix
two quite distinct factors influencing choice. One is the "essential nature of
the service," which is thought to compel patients to seek medical attention.
The other is the hospital's "decisive" economic advantage that enables it to
dictate terms.
The first factor may be important in many cases. When a patient seeks
emergency, or perhaps even nonemergency care under circumstances not
conducive to reasonable deliberation about the risks of medical treatment-as
may have been the case in Tunkl-courts are justified in disallowing
contractual arrangements "imposed" by the health care provider.
Nevertheless, protecting vulnerable patients in such cases does not warrant a
broad, paternalistic rule in cases involving elective therapy that is, or should
be made to be, conducive to the patient's reasoned evaluation. The Tunkl
court's implied generalization that medical services are intrinsically necessary
ignores the obvious fact that a large percentage of medical procedures are
elective-not essential to maintain life or the patient's ability to function.
Indeed, to describe some of the medical treatments as elective understates the
point. There is substantial evidence that many of the most common
treatments have little or no therapeutic value. 50 Significantly, some of these
49. Rakoff, supra note 47, at 1248-55, argues to the contrary. Regardless of bargaining power,
he would have courts declare all form contract terms which are "not visible" parts of the bargain or
which would not be expected by a "customary shopper" to be presumptively unenforceable (subject to
affirmative defenses that are somewhat vaguely formulated). In general, Rakoffs elaborate argument
for judicial intervention is not persuasive. To the extent his case for judicial control turns on simple
inadvertence to contract terms, however, that concern could be accommodated by requiring that
liability disclaimers be brought to patients' attention.
50. There has been a growing public controversy over the extensive rise of medical treatments
having little or no proven therapeutic value. Much of the controversy has been generated by the
costs of such procedures and the burden they place on health care insurance costs. See, e.g., STAFF OF
SUBCOMM.

ON

OVERSIGHT

AND

INVESTIGATIONS,

HOUSE

COMM.

ON

INTERSTATE

AND

FOREIGN

COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON COST AND QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE: UNNECESSARY
SURGERY 31 (Subcomm. Print 1976) (unnecessary surgical procedures in 1974 cost some $3.92

billion) [hereinafter cited as UNNECESSARY SURGERY]; Califano, U.S. Must Discipline Health-CareMarket,
N.Y. Times, May 6, 1984, at E23, col. 3 (citing Chrysler Corp. Study indicating that 25% of hospital
costs for Chrysler employees "may be due to waste and inefficiency"). The increase in unjustified
risk of iatrogenic injury, however, is significant in its own right. It has, for example, been estimated
that unnecessary surgery produced nearly 12,000 deaths in 1975, a figure derived by applying
mortality rates for all forms of discretionary surgery to surgery deemed to be "unnecessary"-that is,
lacking in therapeutic value. UNNECESSARY SURGERY, supra, at 34. Surgical procedures that have
come under challenge by medical experts include such common procedures as tonsilectomies,
hysterectomies, and cholecystectomies (gall bladder removal). See id.; see also Bolande, Ritualistic
Surgery-Circumcisionand Tonsilectomy, 280 NEW ENG. J. MED. 591 (1969). The increasingly frequent
resort to coronary-artery bypass surgery as treatment for chronic angina has been recently
questioned. See Braunwald, Effects of Coronary-Artery Bypass Grafting on Survival, 309 NEW ENG.J. MED.
1181 (1983) (commenting on a 1977 V.A. study and expressing concern over the frequency with
which the procedure is used-about 160,000 procedures in 1981-given the high cost-about $3.25
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procedures are attributed to patient insistence more than to physicians'
5
advice. '
Even if particular care or treatment is essential for the patient, it need not
imply compulsion to accept the terms and conditions offered by any single
provider. Thus, the choice issue is reduced to a question of the availability of
competitive alternatives. It is plausible to suppose that the choice of
consumer options is limited; it does not follow that in every case the choice is
so circumscribed as to confer monopoly power on the health care provider.
In this regard, one must challenge the Tunkl court's heavy emphasis on the
hospital's exercise of superior bargaining power by its failure to provide an
alternative arrangement whereby persons could buy protection against
negligently caused injury for "additional reasonable fees. ' 52 The pertinent
question is not whether U.C.L.A. provided such an option, but whether such
an option was available at other hospitals in the market.
Concededly, the availability of meaningful choices in the market turns
critically on whether patients would search for alternatives if they were made
available. Some observers argue that most patients do not actively search for
competitive alternatives in medical services generally; others more modestly
53
contend that they would not search for alternative risk arrangements.
Having no empirical evidence on either point, this author's intuition is that
searching for competitive arrangements is fairly limited, in part because for
most patients there is relatively little gain from doing so.54 It may also be
assumed, however, that there is sufficient market searching by marginal
patients to justify some reliance on market arrangements in this area just as in
billion a year-and the questionable, or at least improved, long term benefits-relative to alternative
treatment).
51. See Bolande, supra note 50, at 594.
52. Tunkl, 60 Cal. 2d at 100, 383 P.2d at 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 38. Apart from the availability of
the option to purchase physician responsibility, the court expressed concern that it would not be
certain that the patient received "adequate consideration for the [risk] transfer." Id. at 101, 383 P.2d
at 446, 32 Cal. Rptr at 38. In Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981),
however, a waiver contract between a patient and a university clinic was invalidated even though the
court noted that the defendant's fees were generally lower than fees for like services performed by
private dentists.
53. One of the bases for this skepticism is that because of third-party payments, most patients do
not have a financial incentive to search out health care alternatives on the ground of cost. This is an
aspect of the general moral hazard problem created by insurance. See, e.g., K. ARROW, supra note 35,
at 142. If third-party payments eliminate any financial incentive to search out alternative
arrangements in general, patients presumably would, according to this argument, have no financial
incentive to accept any arrangements that did not offer provider liability (insurance) for negligent
care. In other words, given a choice, patients will always opt for the more expensive full-coverage
arrangement rather than accept any risk themselves. The argument proceeds from a plausible
premise-the existence of some moral hazard-but carries it too far. For one thing, not all health
care services are fully covered by third-party payments. In fact, patients directly pay slightly more
than 30% of the nation's aggregate health care expenses. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (104th ed. 1984). Thus, patients do
retain some incentive to constrain health care consumption. Moreover, if one assumes that patients
would have the incentive to demand full responsiblity for negligence risk at any cost, why is it that
they do not now demand full responsibility-and all-risk insurance-for all iatrogenic risk?
54. It must be supposed that this would not change appreciably under a regime of risk
contracting. The vast number of ailments for which individuals seek out professional health care do
not involve the kinds of medical hazards that would generate concern by either providers or patients.
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any other area. To assume the contrary would imply that there should be not
only no choice of risk arrangements but no choice of other terms (such as
price) governing health care services.
The latter point bears emphasis, for it makes clear that whether a
reasonable health care contract must include physician responsibility for
negligent error is only part of a more general issue of the degree to which
courts will supervise the terms of the contract. If there is reason to think the
bargain is not fair and reasonable in regard to risk allocation, is there not also
reason to think that other terms may be similarly unfair or unreasonable? If
the economic bargaining power is troubling, it is odd that concern is focused
exclusively on one of its less significant manifestations. Why do courts not
examine the price of the services being supplied? If the answer is that
legislatures decide whether to institute such regulation, why are legislatures
not also the proper judges of whether marketplace bargains over the
allocation of risks should be generally enforceable?
B.

The Information Problem

Probably the most common rationale for judicial intervention in
contractual dealings is the absence of information about relevant features of
the contract, most especially the risks being assumed. The "information
problem" is not the absence of information relevant to a contract between two
equally ignorant persons, even one that full information would disclose to be
a poor bargain for both. Instead, the problem arises when one party has
relevant information the other lacks and when withholding enforcement in
favor of the disadvantaged party would create an incentive for fair and
efficient information sharing. Such asymmetry of information is widely
perceived to be a critical problem in the health care context. Tunkl did not
articulate this concern except insofar as it is embodied in the court's more
diffuse concern about bargaining power and contracts of adhesion. Other
observers, however, have considered this to be virtually a dispositive
consideration. 55 It is not.

First, it is not a basis for concern that providers possess relevant
information not possessed by patients. Asymmetry in the possession of
information about the character and magnitude of medical risks can be solved
by requiring providers to convey that information to patients as a condition of
allowing the latter to assume responsibility for those risks. The requirement
of full disclosure could be made as exacting as the nature of the risks
demands, and a court could reasonably insist upon a more complete
disclosure of information than informed consent rules now require.
The difficulty arises from the common perception that relevant
information about risks cannot be meaningfully conveyed to patients. As is
often supposed of ordinary consumers in general, patients are presumed to be
55. See, e.g., Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Economist's View, 1976 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 511,
536-37 (observing that the assumption is widely accepted but "not beyond dispute").
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not only ignorant but inherently incapable of appreciating the significance of
risks. 5 6 The assumed ignorance of accident victims in general, and
malpractice victims in particular, is sometimes buttressed by references to
studies by cognitive psychologists demonstrating consumers' ignorance about
57
and inability to evaluate risks.

A number of studies in cognitive psychology show various biases (or
"heuristics") in risk evaluation by individuals. One of the most common
biases is what Tversky and Kahneman label the "availability heuristic." This
heuristic causes people to weigh disproportionately information with high
salience, memorability, or currency. 5 8 Suppose, for example, a physician tells
a patient that the statistical risk of injury to the eye from cataract removal is
one in one thousand but the patient's sister tells her that a friend recently
suffered blindness from such an operation. The "availability heuristic" causes
the patient to give undue weight to the latter information relative to the
former.
' 59
Another bias relevant to health care is that of "representativeness, "
which is a common misperception of the relationship between sample events
and the population from which they are derived. Representativeness bias is
illustrated by the "gambler's fallacy" of believing that specific outcomes of a
series (for example, a run of "heads" in tossing a coin) must be followed by
outcomes of another sort ("tails")-an implied belief in a law of averages
which views probabilities as necessarily inherent in (or represented by) small
samples. 60 Suppose the eye surgery patient is told the general injury statistics
for cataract surgery but is also told that in the hospital where he is scheduled
for surgery there has been no injury in over 600 cases. One plausible
interpretation of this statistic is that the particular hospital is safer (or that its
surgeons are more skilled) than average and that therefore the odds of
suffering injury are less than one in one thousand. However, the
representativeness bias may lead the patient to the opposite and erroneous
inference that, after 600 cases without incident, the probability of injury
during his operation is actually greater than one in one thousand.
56. With regard to accident victims in general, see, e.g., G. CALABRESI, suprO note 32, at 56
(1970); cf Pierce, EncouragingSafety: The Limits of Tort Low and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV.
1281, 1284-86 (1980). With respect to malpractice victims, see Zeckhauser & Nichols, Lessons from the
Economics of Safety, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 19, 22 & n.7 (S. Rottenberg ed.

1978).
57.

For a selection of some of the principal studies on risk cognition, including most of the

studies cited below, see D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOViC & A. TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:

(1982).
See generally, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and

HEURISTICS AND BIAS

58.

Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973).

See generally, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3
430 (1972).
60. Id. at 435. Other examples of this heuristic include such errors as assigning equal
probabilities to sample statistics based on their similarity (their equal resemblance to the
population), disregarding large differences in sample size. For example, the probability of finding
more than 600 boys in a sample of 1000 babies is incorrectly assigned the same likelihood as the
probability of finding more than 60 boys in a sample of 100, whereas, in fact, the latter is much more
probable. Id. at 437.
59.

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
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These perception problems raise serious questions about the rationality of
patient decisions concerning risk. Zeckhauser and Nichols infer a rule against
contractual risk allocation from the studies of risk perception:
Thus a physician attempting to discuss alternative courses of action with a patient will
have difficulty estimating the probabilities of various adverse outcomes, and the
patient will have difficulty interpreting even the most accurate estimates. Given this
limited information and individuals' difficulties in assessing it,
the conditions required
61
to ensure the efficiency of free contracting will not be met.

Despite the problems Zeckhauser and Nichols observed, the cognitive
psychology studies do not support the conclusion that providers must bear
the risks and that patients must be barred by law from assuming them. First,
the fact that people systematically err in evaluating probabilities does not
mean the probabilities of injury are underestimated. Although some
commentators casually interpret these studies as showing insufficient
appreciation of risk, 62 there is no basis for such a conclusion. In the
hypotheticals above, for example, the probability of adverse outcomes was
exaggerated, not underestimated. The exaggeration would still interfere with
"efficiency of free contracting" as Zeckhauser and Nichols state, but it would
not produce an unwarranted assumption of risk by the patient, as they fear.
Indeed, the availability heuristic is more likely to lead the patient to avoid risk
than to assume it, because bad outcomes will be more vividly reported and
remembered than favorable outcomes ("bad news travels fast," that is, has
greater salience or availability). The direction of error produced by the
representativeness bias is more ambiguous; however, the example suggests
one plausible scenario in which the error is in the direction of exaggerating
risk.
Second, even when biases in risk perception are apt to be particularly
disadvantageous to patients, this finding cannot be translated into a rule
irreversibly imposing liability on health care providers. Such a rule
presupposes that the provider not only possesses all relevant risk information
but can better interpret it. As a matter of mere statistical interpretation,
however, the cited studies do not support this assumption. Indeed, the same
biases are observed in experiments involving scientists with training in
probability theory and statistics. 63 In this connection it ought to be
emphatically noted that physicians' ability to evaluate probabilistic
information has been specifically tested by cognitive psychologists and found
64
wanting.
61.
62.

Zeckhauser & Nichols, supra note 56, at 22.
See sources cited supra note 56.

63.

Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124,

1130 (1974).
64. See, e.g., McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky, On the Elicitation of Preferencesfor Alternative Therapies,
306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982) (physicians unable to see the equivalence of probabilistic data
presented in two different ways; preference for different medical strategies varied according to
whether probable outcome described in terms of mortality or survival, even though each description
contained the same mortality/survival ratio); Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'v REV. 123, 139 (1980) (discussing studies of
"availability" bias in which physicians make same errors as lay persons).
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Bias, then, cuts across professional/lay boundaries. So, too, do other
impediments to understanding risk, such as "cognitive dissonance."
Cognitive dissonance is "a state of tension that occurs whenever an individual
simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that
are psychologically inconsistent."-6 5 Characteristically, dissonance arises after
an individual makes an important choice and is then confronted with
information at odds with the understanding that inspired that decision. A
variety of behavioral responses have been observed by which individuals
subconsciously seek to avoid facing the reality of error or conflict. 6 6 One
common response is the rejection or distortion of post-decision information
which would undermine the beliefs, attitudes, or understanding that led to the
prior decision.
Akerlof and Dickens have noted the implications of cognitive dissonance
for health and safety risks. 6 7 For example, a worker who has voluntarily
accepted employment in a hazardous workplace may refuse to recognize the
risk insofar as it implies that he was foolish to accept the job. In the
immediate context of health care one can imagine a similar problem.
Suppose, after years of smoking, a person exhibits cancer symptoms. Seeking
diagnosis and therapy may be psycholgically difficult insofar as it implies prior
neglect of health. The individual experiencing dissonance will be disposed to
minimize the risk of neglecting to seek treatment in order to protect his selfimage. Once the condition is diagnosed, the individual, again seeking to
spare himself from recognizing the full consequences of his previous
mistakes, would be disposed to minimize the risk of therapy.
The problem of a patient minimizing therapy risk is compounded if the
provider has a similarly distorted risk perception. Suppose, for example, that
the doctor believes a particular therapy is optimal for the patient and has used
the therapy repeatedly on other patients. Cognitive dissonance would impair
his acknowledgment of risk-for a "responsible" physician would not have
68
subjected patients to therapy that was not wholly in their best interests.
The essential point of the argument thus far is that cognitive bias is a
human characteristic, as likely to affect risk perception by physicians as by
patients. Of course, since health care institutions are not human, we might
suppose them to be unbiased. This supposition assumes either an
institutional rationality independent of human judgments or decisionmaking
processes capable of correcting human bias. The first assumption represents
too simplistic a reification of organizational function, but the second
65.

66.
67.

E. ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 88 (2d ed. 1976).
See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 264-65 (1957).
Akerlof & Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307

(1982).
68. Such dissonance may partly explain providers' unusually sharp reaction to legal secondguessing of their own "expert" judgments concerning risk. The irony is that this very dissonance
supports the case for legal liability in order to correct biased risk perspectives. This assertion does
not contradict the argument for contractual risk allocation, for similar corrective effects can be
achieved through contract, as discussed below.
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assumption is plausible. The process of routinized (bureaucratized)
decisionmaking within institutions may screen out the biases or errors of
individual human judgment. If depersonalized decisionmaking by individuals
within an organization permits greater rationality about risk and can
surmount biases distorting personal decisions, then perhaps the burden of
risk should be imposed on institutional health care providers. Indeed, if the
problem were only one of risk perception, a fixed and invariant legal rule to
that effect might be acceptable. But another element of risk assessment must
be considered: risk preference.
Risk evaluations involve both cognitions and attitudes toward risk. A
provider may indeed be better able rationally to understand risks but may be
incapable of appreciating what those risks mean to any given individual. Yet,
the typical discussion of risk allocation ignores individual risk preference, or
rather ignores its individual variation. The usual assumption is that people
uniformly wish to avoid all risks, and therefore the search is only for the
"cheapest" way of doing so. Cheap risk avoidance becomes a kind of
technological question. Calabresi implies this when he observes (regarding
the importance of rules facilitating private adjustments of behavior through
what he calls "bribes") that contractual risk allocations show "we do not know
collectively who the cheapest cost avoider is, since if we did we would have
allocated the costs to him in the beginning." 69 Calabresi's observation is
incomplete because it fails to recognize the positive value in private ordering
based on personal preferences without regard to social optimality. Indeed, if
the private bargain captures all the significant social costs, it is not useful to
postulate a social optimum apart from what the parties choose for themselves
(assuming fair and equal bargaining, as previously discussed).
Some would say that the present legal bar to patient assumption of risk
reflects the preference of the vast majority of individuals. On this account, the
legal rule expresses the result that would generally be reached anyway by
contracting parties. This argument embraces two distinct points. One is that
patients, acting naturally, do not or will not seek alternative risk
arrangements. The second is that most patients do not wish to know or even
to think about the risk of medical maloccurrences, but rather rely implicitly on
health care providers to make the appropriate judgments. Essential to this
reliance is provider accountability for making reasonable judgments. This
paternalism by delegation is supposedly satisfactory to providers as long as
their legal accountability is not enforced too rigorously.
It is unlikely that the present arrangements are precisely what most
patients and providers would make for themselves if guided by their own
informed preferences rather than by the preferences of judges. There is no
strong empirical evidence one way or the other, although some informed
consent studies indicate a general preference of patients for more risk
69.

G.

CALABRES1, supra note

32, at 151.
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information. 70 Too, consumers' voluntary insurance purchases reflect choices
somewhat different from what liability rules select for victims, such as
compensation for pain and suffering (though moral hazard problems may also
explain the absence of first-party coverage). But it is difficult to ascertain the
parties' true preferences under a legal regime that fails to give those
preferences legal significance.
The patients' ignorance argument against letting patients voluntarily
assume risks is thus poorly supported by the factual assumptions underlying
it. Also, the argument is inconsistent with accepted rules governing the
allocation of the risk of nonnegligent injuries. If patients are really incapable
of dealing with medical risks, they should not be allowed to accept the risk of
nonnegligent treatment. Present liability rules, however, assign to patients all
risks that they cannot demonstrate were produced by negligence. Only a
strict liability system, in which the health care provider bears all of the risks,
would be truly congruent with the assumption of patient ignorance. Despite
common acceptance of the consumer ignorance assumption, there is not a
broad accord among legal scholars, courts, or others of the assumption's full
7
implications. '
Finally, the assumption of patient ignorance is at odds with the trend
toward greater physician disclosure as a prerequisite of informed consent,
which is premised on a new appreciation of the value of patient autonomy and
responsibility in making choices about health care. If a patient's choice of
medical risks is not to be subordinated to his physician's judgment, why
should his choice of legal risks be subordinated to the judgment of his lawyer
or a judge? Is it possible that the different weight accorded to patient
autonomy in the two situations is only a reflection of the legal profession's
hubristic assumption that, while physicians adhering to medical custom
cannot be trusted to decide what is in their patients' interests, the legal system
knows what is best?
C.

Deterrence and Moral Hazard

The Tunkl court's fifth criterion implies a fear that contracted-for immunity
will impair the deterrent function of liability. The apprehended effect is
72
analogous to that of the "moral hazard" associated with liability insurance.
Some moral hazard is already present to the extent the health care provider is
70. See Meisel & Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of the
Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (1983).
71. The strict liability implications of patient risk misperception have not, however, gone
unnoticed. See, e.g., P. Danzon, supra note 15 (which in turn draws on the analysis of products risks in
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Product Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977)).
72. "Moral hazard" is conventionally used to describe the effect of insurance in distorting
insureds' incentives in regard to the insured event, for example, the overconsumption of health care
by persons with health care insurance. See, e.g., K. ARROW, supra note 35, at 142; Marshall, ioral
Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976); Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 531 (1968). The term is used here in a broader sense of describing all changes in incentives in
response to contractual indemnity or immunity. The essential problem remains unchanged in this
broader context.
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insured against liability and the costs of that insurance are not precisely
matched to his actions. Contractual immunity would supposedly expand the
scope of moral hazard by removing any possible penalty for malfeasance.
This concern about lost deterrence is not well founded. If the bargain is
fair and reasonable, the problem is not different from any other contractual
arrangements involving risk. The central problem of moral hazard is one not
merely of incentives but of asymmetry of information about the future risk
behavior of the party who does not bear the risk. 73 When the moral hazard

problem is obvious-as it seems to be here-one must suppose that it will
affect the terms of the contractual arrangement and that patients will not
lightly relieve providers of accountability for the harms they cause. Patients
will insist on other means of quality assurance or will demand comparable
compensation. The effect of either demand on the provider is to penalize
performance below the level that patients expect. In short, tort incentives
thereby become contract incentives. The transformation of incentives by
contract might produce less efficient social allocations than those externally
imposed by tort law. The parties are presumed to understand that risk and
yet still regard the overall bargain as mutually advantageous; otherwise they
would not enter into the arrangement.
If the two parties regard the contract as a sound bargain, the only question
remaining is whether their private agreement fully reflects (internalizes)
relevant social costs. The Tunkl court's attempted distinction between private
and public interests suggests a negative answer, but apart from the concerns
addressed above it is not apparent what justifies this response. It could be
argued that allocating risks of medical injuries implicates social
responsibilities that should not be determined by the immediately affected
parties. Given this premise, however, it would be hard to account for the fact
that society relies almost entirely on private parties to enforce those
responsibilities. If private contractual relationships cannot fairly represent
the social interests at stake, presumably private tort actions cannot fairly
represent them either. It would follow that there should be a mechanism for a
public representative to supervise every out-of-court claim settlement
between plaintiffs and defendants in order to see that broad social ("public
policy") concerns are met. It would also presumably be necessary to have
public representatives intervene in litigation for the same purpose and to
make sure that all meritorious claims are brought to the courts' attention.
The foregoing critique of arguments for invalidating contractual risk
allocation may miss the real objection to permitting waiver of negligence
liability. Reading Tunkl and other discussions one senses that the real source
of hostility is an unarticulated moral objection to permitting persons to avoid
responsibility for "wrongdoing." It is difficult to address this argument in the
absence of a clear identification of the nature and source of the moral
judgment. The moral argument for allowing contractual risk assumption73. See Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection, 88 Q.J. EcON. 44 (1974).
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respecting individual choice and autonomy-was mentioned earlier. Even if
one does not attach great moral value to choices involving risk, the hard fact
of life is that some such choices cannot be avoided. The question then is what
warrants singling out these particular risk choices from the rest of the moral
universe. Granted, practical reasons such as those just examined might so
undermine meaningful choice as to support legal interference with private
ordering and external, social costs might be created which would justify
interference. If, as argued above, these circumstances are not present in the
particular case, is there still some residual, overarching ethical or moral
(fairness) objection to private ordering? Is it possible that there is some
perceived "injustice" or "unfairness" in enforcing a contractual waiver of
responsibility for tortious conduct?
The answer, it seems to me, is no. The objection from morality-if such it
can be called-misconceives a contractual waiver as excusing or granting an
indulgence for wrongdoing. The imputation of moral significance to most
medical accidents stretches the limits of moral judgment rather far, but in any
case the waiver is not the same thing as an excuse or an indulgence in the
ordinary (moral) sense. The purpose of the contract is not to excuse some
egregious and obvious error that has already occurred, but to avoid the risk
that a contempleted act will at some future date be judged by a somewhat
unreliable third party (a court or jury) to be an error under a somewhat
artificial legal (hardly a moral) standard. Even if providers' attempts to obtain
forgiveness for errors already committed were thought to be morally
offensive, efforts to escape accountability under the imperfect legal system
cannot be thought to be morally repugnant. The flaws of the tort system as a
moral arbiter would seem clear enough that private parties should not be
bound to submit to it.
D.

No-Fault Risk Allocation

A few words are appropriate about no-fault insurance alternatives to
liability insofar as they may be tied to contractual arrangements. Inasmuch as
no-fault insurance might be one arrangement for which the parties could
contract as a means of allocating medical risk, the case for contract can be
melded with the case for substituting consensual no-fault compensation for
conventional tort remedies, as O'Connell and others have proposed.7 4 On
the premise that both parties are capable of making an informed decision
about their own risk-bearing preferences, there is no justification for
compelling one party to accept the other party's preferences. However, there
is also no basis for objecting to a mutual agreement to implement the no-fault
plan.
74. See O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurancefor Many
Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 529 (1976); Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 277. O'Connell's consensual no-fault proposal should be
distinguished from his other form of "elective no-fault," which involves the provider's unilateral
election. See O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal lYuy Claims by Defendants'
Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 589 (1982).
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Of course, if the parties are free to make their own risk allocation
arrangements, one might question whether there is any point to developing
an elaborate statutory system of no-fault insurance. The answer is that there
might be advantages in having a state-approved plan which the parties could
adopt (or reject) by private agreement. One advantage is the opportunity to
mold a plan that is officially scrutinized for balance and fairness, ameliorating
judicial concerns about contracts of adhesion: if the no-fault allocation were
accepted in the contract, legislative approval of the particular terms would
presumably deem the contract "officially fair." Neither party would be forced
to accept it, but the very existence of such an option could force the parties to
confront the question of risk allocation and not hide behind the illusion of
risklessness.
A second advantage of an officially approved "risk plan" is one common to
all form contracts ("adhesive" or not): it economizes on transaction costs.
The term "transaction costs" is used broadly here, to include any
impediments to arriving at an informed agreement. One of the strongest
obstacles to contractual risk allocation arrangements is simply the perception
that such arrangements are out of character with the physician/patient
relationship. As noted earlier, the image of medical professionalism has been
promoted in part by attempting to remove health care from the commercial
marketplace. One consequence has been to create an environment in which
contractual bargaining is awkward for both physician and patient insofar as it
appears to undermine the implicit element of trust and confidence that is
fostered by the image of the physician as a professional and fiduciary. In this
regard, formalism may be most important by reducing the friction which
people might otherwise perceive to be inherent in contractual dealings.
Particularly when the formalism embodies officially scrutinized terms, it seems
likely to gain greater acceptance by parties who are accustomed to a high
degree of paternalism in health care.
There is, of course, no reason why the officially sanctioned terms must take
the form of no-fault insurance. Indeed, there is no reason why they must take
any single form at all. One can imagine a variety of risk allocation options that

might receive an official seal of approval. Legislation providing an array of
preformed arrangements would reduce the economic costs and ease the social
resistance to contractual dealings, while still providing a degree of flexibility
that could not be obtained from a single form contract. 75 If a legislature
should accept this suggestion and specify the terms of some "officially fair"
arrangements, it should also explicitly deny the implication that other
arrangements, voluntarily arrived at, are presumptively unfair and
unenforceable.
75. A similar suggestion for preformed contracts to minimize transactions costs is made by
Reder, An Economic Analysis of Medical Malpractice, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 277 (1976). The advantages
and disadvantages of preformed contract terms, in a commercial context, are examined at length in
Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied
Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985).
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Effects of Contractual Risk Assumption

Widespread patient assumption of risk would have effects on insurance
arrangements for providers and patients that warrant brief notice even though
the details of this subject are beyond the scope of this article. Implicit in
much of the foregoing discussion is the assumption that a contractual shift of
risk from providers to patients would also shift insurance costs from thirdparty malpractice coverage to other insurers such as first-party health and
disability insurers. 7 6 The likely magnitude of such a shift is difficult to predict.
Insofar as malpractice insurance is community rated, limited use of such
contracts would probably have no immediate effect on insurance costs for
individual providers. Individual providers who can contract out of risk might,
however, choose to self-insure ("go bare") or to reduce their coverage.
Moreover, the withdrawal of a significant number of risks from the insurance
pool would in time presumably affect the rates for the entire class of providers
affected.
The effect on first-party insurance is more ambiguous. At first glance it
might seem that a reduction of third-party insurance premiums would
produce a symmetrical increase in first-party premiums covering the same
risks. Such a symmetrical increase presupposes, however, that the payment
obligation is merely transferred unchanged from third-party to first-party
payers. In fact, first-party insurers already pay a significant portion of the
costs of medical accidents, and to the extent of this double payment by firstand third-party payers, 7 7 the patient's assumption of risk would not increase
first-party insurance premiums.
To the extent that premium costs would be increased, it is desirable to
have them borne only by those contracting with the providers rather than to
spread them among the entire pool of insureds. Otherwise, the addition of
new high risks could pollute the pool by adverse selection. 78 At least in
principle it should be possible to avoid the adverse selection problem; insofar
as the high-risk insureds identify themselves by contracting to assume risks
heretofore borne by providers, the insurer should be able to make individual
79
premium adjustments to the extent that the reallocated risks are significant.

76. The transfer could also be from malpractice insurers to other third-party insurers when
other tortfeasors are jointly liable for the medical accident costs. This article is concerned only with
the transfer from third-party to first-party payers.
77. Double payment assumes, of course, subrogation of the first-party payer to the victim's
claim. Subrogation in this context varies. For health care insurance, subrogation is generally
dependent on express provision in policies, and the use of such provisions, while increasing, is not
universal. To make matters more complex, some courts have invalidated express subrogation
clauses in this context. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 150-53 (1971).
78. See generally Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons ". Quality UncertaintY and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. EcON. 488 (1970); Pauly, supra note 73.
79. Some such adjustment is impliedly assumed in the discussion of shifting incentives, supra
notes 53, 72 and accompanying text.
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IV
CONCLUSION

In marked contrast to the usual abstract context in which Coase's
"solution" to accident cost allocation is discussed, the medical situation
provides at least a plausible occasion for considering the contract option.
There are no insurmountable economic impediments to bargaining; the only
significant transaction costs are the impediments imposed by a social (or
social cum legal) culture that views the relationship between patient and health
care provider as one of status more than contract-a culture in which the
allocation of risk is, in Walzer's phrase, a "blocked exchange." 8 0 While this
paternalistic attitude agrees with the image that the medical profession has
promoted and defended aggressively since the turn of the century, it is out of
touch with the reality of modern health care services. It is ironic that
physicians are blocked from negotiating different risk allocation arrangements
with their patients largely by the world view that they themselves so
assiduously cultivated.
Social culture aside, there are more positive, tangible objections to
freedom of contract. It is said that the particular vulnerability of patients
demands special legal solicitude and judicial restrictions on their freedom to
assume the risks of medical error. Although I am skeptical about the need for
aggressive judicial intervention in so-called "unconscionable bargain" cases
generally, I concede that there may be appropriate instances for judicial
protection-even for "paternalism," if you will. Certain types of medical
treatment cases suggest themselves as presumptively within that category.
Emergency treatment would certainly qualify for special solicitude; so too
might certain nonemergency cases when treatment is urgent and patient
options are restricted by inherent limitations of the market, or when the
patient's situation suggests a special vulnerability to overreaching. The
traditional legal posture that medical risks must be judicially assigned is not
convincing, however. That posture reflects several dubious notions about
health care in general and about medical risks in particular. As to health care,
the central misconception is that it is so inherently essential and the course of
treatment so obviously prescribed by medical "science" that the patient has
no real choice. In fact, medical science has not overcome all uncertainty, and
most health care services are not compelled in the sense that there are no
practical options with respect to the nature of the treatment or the manner in
which and conditions on which they are delivered.
The assumption of full disclosure is, of course, central to the argument. It
is widely thought that patients' inability to evaluate probabilistic information
precludes rational risk assessment. But the inability of individuals to evaluate
risk is largely irrelevant in the context of contractual transactions between
80. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 100-03 (1983). Walzer's examples of "blocked
exchanges" are too general to be applied to liability waivers, although certain cases could fall within
his category of "disparate exchanges" which are prohibited.
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individuals who share the same disability. Nor is there anything peculiar
about medical risks that sets them apart from other accident risks. If inability
to evaluate risk is a basis for restricting assumption of risk in the medical
context, it should also be a basis for superintending all individual behavior
involving judgments about risks.
It is appropriate to close with a disclaimer. If there was a medical
malpractice "crisis" in the 1970's, I doubt it could have been resolved simply
by allowing doctors to contract out of liability for risks. Nor do I think such a
change in legal policy can itself correct the alleged present crisis. Most health
care providers would probably not want to use exculpatory clauses because
they would not want to risk arousing patient suspicion or patient demands for
some consideration in the form of price concessions. (If individual patients
did not demand concessions, organized purchasers, such as employer groups,
probably would.) Nevertheless, some health care providers might well seek to
shift liability for some types of risks. For example, obstetricians or birthing
centers might seek to avoid liability for deformed infants (liability might be
predicated on failure to detect and disclose the abnormality) and might
indeed be willing to meet demands for a contractual quid pro quo. That the
number of such arrangements is likely to be too limited to transform tort law
into contract law does not distinguish this small reform from dozens of other
sensible measures that could improve, at the margin, the functioning of the
legal system.
As to improving the health care system, the disclaimer must be made even
more forcefully. The "political pathology of health care policy," to borrow
Wildavsky's phrase, 8 ' is a matter largely beyond the ken of the common law.
The most that can be said of changes in legal liability rules along the lines
suggested here is that they are consistent with the direction of larger reforms
aimed at diversifying health care practice and containing the hemorrhaging of
health care expenditures. No more can be expected; even if one were
dramatically to reduce and not merely reallocate the costs of medical
82
malpractice, the impact on overall health care costs would be very small.

Again, however, we ought not be paralyzed by the thought that behind one
problem solved there remain larger ones yet unsolved.

Wildavsky, Doing Better and Feeling Worse: The Political Pathology of Health Policy, in DOING
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 105 (J. Knowles ed. 1977).
82. Taking medical malpractice premium costs as a rough measure of the costs of malpractice
risks-and ignoring the costs of defensive medicine-the ratio of such costs to total health care
expenditures is less than one percent. See MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS OF
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TORT REFORM PROPOSALS 2 (1985) (1984 premium costs were $2.7
billion); Levit, supra note 17 (1984 health care expenditures totalled $387.4 billion).
81.
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